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The number of interstate wars between countries
in the global South has declined over the last
twenty years. The decline in wars has been
accompanied by numerous important transitions
from authoritarian rule to democratic
governance, making democracy the norm rather
than the exception. However, while war as the
source of violence and insecurity in the global
South has declined, violent crime has shown an
alarming and steady increase in newly
democratised states, becoming a major source of
insecurity. It is imperative therefore to think of
violent crime within the context of democratic
transitions more broadly. 
The promise offered by South Africa’s first
democratic elections in 1994 was that, with the
end of apartheid, levels of violence in South
African society would drop significantly.
However, various forms of social violence at all
levels of society, ranging from armed robbery to
sexual violence and murder, have remained at
extremely high levels. Although the rate of
murder has declined slightly from approximately
20 000 murders a year to about 18 000 last year,
South Africa still has one of the highest per capita
murder rates in the world. Therefore the right to
life, one of the supreme rights in our Constitution
and a fundamental prerequisite for all other
rights, is significantly under threat. 
The continuing high levels of violence in South
African society have provoked what can be
termed a ‘radical problem of understanding’
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This article argues for the importance of an international comparative perspective in terms of our
analysis and response to violent crime. This is particularly important in the light of the fact that while an
increasing number of countries in the global South1 have achieved formal democracy, they continue to be
plagued by high levels of violent crime. In fact, transitions from authoritarian to democratic governance
around the world, from Eastern Europe to Latin America and Africa, have been accompanied by
escalating violent crime rates. In this context, we have much to learn from an international comparative
approach in terms of understanding why democratic transitions are so often accompanied by increases in
violence, what the impact of this violence is on the ability of these societies to deepen democracy, and
what the most appropriate interventions are in relatively new and often resource poor democracies. 
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among both ordinary citizens and the state itself,
as indicated by the shifts in state security strategy
over the last 14 years. However, this problem of
understanding is premised on a normative belief
that democracy inevitably brings an end to
violence in society. On the other hand, as theorists
such as David Apter2 have argued, globalisation
and democratisation can in fact create new forms
of marginalisation and opportunities for violence,
for example as a result of deepening economic
inequality. In this framework, violence is in fact
the product of the form many modern
democracies are taking. 
PLACING OURSELVES IN CONTEXT
In contrast to the assumption that democracy
ends violence, the South African experience,
taken in the international context, is neither
entirely exceptional nor unique. This is where an
international comparative perspective is critical, as
it enables us to problematise the normative
assumption that democracy ends violence, and
clears the way for us to begin to understand how
the processes of democracy and violence are in
fact linked and how these dynamics have
manifested themselves in other countries,
particularly those societies with similar levels of
violent crime and high levels of economic
inequality. 
An international comparative approach also
allows us to unpack some of our assumptions
about the causes of violent crime, to acknowledge
the complexities of these assumed causal relations,
and to develop a differentiated approach to the
analysis of violence by taking into account
international variations in the patterns of violence.
In this light, writer Amartya Sen3 on a speaking
tour in South Africa emphasised the need to avoid
easy answers and rushed solutions to the problem
of violence that tend to assume, rather than
question, the causes of violence. 
Just two examples of such assumptions will suffice
to demonstrate the point: that there is inevitably a
link between poverty and violence; and a link
between a high number of guns and violence. As
Amartya Sen points out, Calcutta, one of the
poorest cities in India, has one of the lowest crime
levels in the country. On the other hand, while
Canadians have more guns than Americans, their
murder rates are much lower than in the USA.  
Not only does an international comparative
perspective allow us to better understand
violence, but it also helps us to understand the
nature of contemporary democracy itself more
systematically. To date scholars of democratisation
have largely ignored the coincidence between
processes of democratisation and violent crime.
However, exploring the link between violence and
democratisation enables us to begin to unpack
why the form that democracy has taken in the
global South in the new millennium has been
characterised by continued violence in South
Africa and elsewhere.4 It allows us to analyse and
respond to the conditions that create new
opportunities for violence in the democratic
context, be they marginalisation, economic
inequality, or, in the South African context, the
historical legacy of apartheid.
An international comparative study also enables
us to better understand the impact of violent
crime on the consolidation of democracy.
Examining other societies that have experienced
the twin processes of democratisation and
violence, it is clear that violent crime has a
significantly fracturing effect on society. It
impedes the state’s ability to deepen and
consolidate democracy, and undermines its
legitimacy in the face of its perceived incapacity
to respond effectively to violence. Violence also
undermines the development of shared spaces of
social citizenship, as citizens retreat in the face of
violence to increasingly parochial forms of social
organisation.  
Lastly, and more pragmatically, drawing on
insights from countries experiencing similar
problems of violence and democratisation enables
us to explore and compare, in the context of the
resource constraints in the global South, the most
appropriate interventions to respond to violent
crime. Importantly, if we are seeking to deepen
and consolidate democracy, we need to explore
the most effective ways of responding to violence
in a democratic environment that do not rely on a
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return to authoritarian and violent modes of
response, such as has occurred in Brazil,5 and
hence significantly undermine the very processes
of democratisation they are allegedly intended to
defend. 
CRIME AND TRANSITION 
It has been widely noted that many societies that
have experienced a transition from authoritarian
to democratic rule, as was the case in South
Africa, have experienced a rapid escalation in
crime rates, including violent crime. Continents
and countries that have since the 1970s
experienced this correlation between
democratisation and rising rates of crime and
violence include Latin America, the former
communist states of Eastern and Central Europe,
as well as democratising states in Africa, most
notably South Africa itself. Ironically, while more
countries than ever before have attained
democracy in the sense of constitutionalism and
multiparty electoral competition, substantial
evidence shows that global rates of violent crime
have also surged. In a recent cross-national study
of homicide victimisation rates in thirty-four
countries, LaFree and Drass found that on
average, homicide rates doubled during the last
four decades of the twentieth century. 
Another study of homicide levels in 44 countries
for the period 1950-2000 shows that increases in
violent crime have been especially pronounced in
precisely those regions of the world in which
democracy has recently taken hold, including
Latin America, Eastern Europe, the ‘breakaway’
republics of the former Soviet Union, and Sub-
Saharan Africa.6
The study further indicates that countries
transitioning between autocratic and democratic
regimes experienced a significant increase in
homicide rates. In the former Soviet Union,
homicide rates tripled between 1988 and 1994,
after the collapse of the communist state.
Critically, a significant proportion of this
violence, as in South Africa, was interpersonal
violence. 
The authors of a study on the Soviet Union draw
on Durkheim to explain these trends. They argue
that, ‘distinct from the effects on violence of rapid
social change and anomie, Durkheim argued that
during periods of acute political crisis,
interpersonal violence will increase due to the
threat to collective sentiments posed by the crisis’.7
Durkheim’s modernisation theory is the most
famous sociological theory explaining variation in
homicide rates. The social and economic
transformation a country goes through in the
process of development and modernisation is seen
as having important consequences for violent
crime rates. Traditional forms of status relations,
role allocations, social organisation and control are
disrupted and ultimately destroyed as masses of
people leave their rural homes and flood into the
anonymous urban conglomerates. The resulting
alienation of people, who are often faced with
unemployment or under-employment and poverty,
and the lack of social integration (so-called
anomie) or social capital, leads to increased crime
rates, including violent crime rates. Modernisation
theory predicts that strong economic growth raises
homicide rates as it disrupts traditional modes of
social organisation and control.8
It is evident that this conception of modernisation
theory underpins current understandings of
violent crime in the South African context. There
is increasing reference to the breakdown of social
cohesion and social capital, which is perceived to
have created an anomic context in which violent
crime is likely to occur. Shaw notes in this vein,
‘[A]part from generating particular forms of
criminality (most notably the organised variety),
transitions also have important impacts on the
social controls present in any society. In many
instances a weakening of these provides an
environment that may be more conducive to
criminality.’9
It is in this context that we have seen over the past
few years the increasing use of the concept of
‘social cohesion’ within the policy environment. It
is argued that in order to reduce levels of violence,
we need to transform the ways in which citizens
relate to one another as citizens. 
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However, in South Africa and in postcolonial
societies in general, this notion of ‘good citizens’
who police themselves in terms of a commonly
held set of norms and values, runs aground in a
context that has historically been characterised by
multiple overlapping systems of social authority
and normative regimes. As the Nigerian political
scientist Ekeh and others have noted, the African
colonial experience, and in particular the
experience of indirect rule, creates multiple spaces
of rights and obligations and ethical conduct that
are not necessarily concordant with the juridical
rights and obligations normatively articulated in a
document such as the South African Constitution.
It is in this context that we see the impact of
violent crime in creating forms of community that
are at odds with unifying nation-building efforts
of governments. The result is balkanised zones of
governance and citizenship in the global South: in
informal settlements, gated communities,
vigilante groups and gangs.  
Areas most affected by violent crime also tend to
be the areas most affected by everyday or
structural violence. In Brazil they are the favelas.
The informal settlement of Kibera in Kenya is
now the second largest area in Africa (after
Soweto) described as a ‘slum’ by UN-Habitat.10 In
South Africa, the areas most affected are black
communities in mega-townships, mostly working
class, with high levels of unemployment and
poverty. In contexts of ongoing socio-economic
deprivation, ‘community’ can thus become an
identity that coheres around a notion of
marginalisation and social exclusion. People
identify themselves as victims of a lack of delivery
and poor local government representation and
service, and see themselves as a community in
opposition to the state. In the South African
context this has been most explicitly articulated in
so-called ‘service delivery protests’. According to a
study conducted by the Freedom of Expression
Institute, by May 2007 fifteen recorded protests
were being held per day somewhere in South
Africa – excluding unrecorded protests.11
In a survey of violent crime in the sprawling
metropolis of Lagos, Nigeria, it was found that,
faced with high incidence and fear of crime,
‘many communities and individuals took several
measures to reduce their feeling of vulnerability
and minimise risk of victimisation. Eighty one
percent of the respondents said that vigilantes
existed in their communities, while seventy seven
percent reported that the vigilantes were paid for
their services’.12 In South Africa there has also
been an increasing emergence of vigilante groups
across the country, both more formally organised
groupings such as the People Against
Gangsterism and Drugs in the Western Cape, and
similar groups in KwaZulu-Natal that started out
as community neighbourhood watches, some of
which have taken on violent and racialised forms.
‘Community’ in the case of Pagad and the
neighbourhood watches in Chatsworth speak to
the recovery of a religious and racially hegemonic
social morality fraying at the seams as a result of
substance abuse, gangsterism and poverty.13
In less organised forms there have been sporadic
violent outbursts of community action against
criminals or those suspected of having
committed crimes. Black South African
townships, suffering the structural violence of
poverty and unemployment, have also cohered
around that which comes from outside and
threatens, or is perceived to threaten or impede,
the life chances of local citizens. Within this
category of external threats are those who are
seen to be taking prospective jobs and income
generating opportunities, or undercutting local
business people by selling staple goods at a
cheaper price within townships and informal
settlements. The target around which
‘community’ coheres in this particular instance
becomes foreign Africans, designated colloquially
as Amakwerekwere, who have become victims of
xenophobic violence.
On the other hand, middle class residents are able
to mobilise resources, information, technologies,
and organisation in defence of their residential
security. This has led to the proliferation of ‘gated
communities’. Typically these have involved
setting up access control around older
neighbourhoods, and blocking off a street or
blocks of streets, organised by residents within an
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area. Private security guards are employed to
regulate the inward and outward movement of
people and vehicles within a neighbourhood.  
VIOLENT CRIME AS A THREAT TO
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY
The lack of confidence in state agencies providing
adequate levels of safety has led to an increasing
‘privatisation’ of security on a global scale, either
through the formal security industry in middle
class areas, or the alternative forms of social
ordering that emerge in poorly resourced and
badly policed townships, slum areas and informal
settlements. In these contexts the perceived
incapacity of the state to provide adequate
security, as it either retreats from these spaces of
insecurity or is seen to be an explicit part of the
problem through corruption or violence, leads to
the unravelling of ‘one of the foundational myths
of modern societies: namely that the sovereign
state is capable of providing security, law and
order, and crime control’.14 As Perez argues, 
The failure to deepen democracy and rule of
law and to extend citizenship rights across all
social sectors shakes public confidence in the
police and judicial system, weakens the rule of
law, and increasingly undermines support for
democracy.15
Democratic societies rule through consent rather
than outright coercion, and therefore rely on the
acceptance of the authority of the state. The
authority of the state is dependent on the
legitimacy of its rule, and this in turn requires a
positive disposition towards it from citizens. One
of the core responsibilities of a state, underpinned
by a human rights approach, is the protection of
the ‘right to life’. The way in which the state
protects this right can impact on its long term
legitimacy and authority. High levels of violent
crime, murder and assault indicate that the state
might not be adequately creating the environment
for a safe and secure community, therefore
impacting on its capacity to govern effectively. 
In this environment, the forms of ‘community’
that emerge are often mobilised against an ‘other’
that increasingly fosters separation. In her study
of spatial separation in Cape Town, Charlotte
Lemansky observes that, based on the Latin
American experience, ‘walls and gates have
reinforced a vicious cycle of poverty and
exclusion by concentrating the poorest social
groups in spaces with minimal economic and
political leverage… Furthermore, enclaves do not
just respond to difference and fear, but actually
deepen segregation and reinforce fear by
excluding difference and limiting social mixing,
thus increasing paranoia and mistrust between
groups.’16 In this study it became clear that the
view of the middle class white area was that
‘crime originated from outside the community’.17
The community could therefore establish a level
of ‘trust’ and social relations that bound them
together in relation to an external threat. They
could collectively keep a look out for this ‘threat’,
and draw on and develop practices and
technologies in order to do this. Similarly, in her
study of gated communities in Sao Paulo,
Caldiera noted that the ‘withdrawal of the upper
classes from public space into enclaves leads to
the emergence of a discourse associating
criminality and poverty, and generates
stereotypical images of the poor as inherently
“dangerous”’.18
These imaginaries of the poor, as those to be
placed outside the spatial zones of safety, means
relinquishing the shared social space of
citizenship, and narrowing of conceptions of
rights and obligations. In her work on Brazil,
Scheper-Hughes noted the mutually determining
relationship between the fate of the urban poor
and the fears of the middle classes: 
Meanwhile, the affluent and the powerful,
tucked away in gated communities and in
homes protected by armed guards and
mechanical surveillance reminiscent of
medieval fortresses safely imagine themselves
as endangered rather than as endangering
populations.19
Under siege, the middle classes do not see the
proportion of wealth at their disposal as directly
of consequence to the level of fear they live with
in a society with stark material inequalities.
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The residential spaces of safety of the middle
classes are accompanied by fortified enclaves
where work takes place, as well as consumption
and leisure. These zones are connected by road
and transport systems that favour the wealthy,
creating an interlinked ‘fortified network’, which
could eventually ‘disembed’ the city. The trend
towards malls, highways, and transport systems
like the Gautrain project, which favours the
middle classes, may be indications of this trend in
South Africa. 
Thus the forms of social cohesion that violent
crime is creating shows signs of being at odds with
the forms of social cohesion envisioned and
assumed by policies of the national government.
While there are positive community formations to
manage risk, poor communities are also showing
signs of cohering around marginalisation, social
exclusion, xenophobia, and susceptibility to gender
and sexual violence. Violence, as experienced by
middle class communities increasingly pessimistic
about the state’s capacity to provide safety, shows
signs of creating enclave communities with
privatised security, which could lead increasingly
to cohesion around fear of ‘the poor’. 
If social cohesion continues in these fragmented
and mutually exclusive spatial zones, social
polarisation will continue to create racially
separate ‘publics’, with different benefits, rights and
obligations, and fragmented experiences of
citizenship.
AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
ON VIOLENCE AND
DEMOCRATISATION 
Countries in Latin America and Africa are
experiencing many similar processes as a result of
globalisation, regional migration and the
urbanisation of human settlements, which are
impacting on citizenship and democratisation at
local levels. As Smith argues, writing about the
growth of vigilante violence in Nigeria ‘in response
to perceived failures of government’20 since the
inauguration of the country’s first civilian
government in 16 years in 1999: 
public optimism that democracy would ensure
economic growth and political growth has
given way to frustration… perhaps nothing
symbolises the disappointments of democracy
more than the all-consuming public concern
that crime is rampant and out of control. The
intense sense of insecurity that pervades the
country, expressed most clearly in concerns
about violent crime, represents larger anxieties
about economic deprivation and political
insecurity. Crime is portrayed as both the cause
and consequence of the nation’s ills.21
In this context in Nigeria, ‘vigilantism’s popularity
is a response to a widely shared sense that recent
political and economic reforms have led to
greater inequality and injustice…’22
In Latin America similar concerns are evident, as
Perez asserts: ‘Across Latin America…fear of
crime and perceptions of social disorder are
widespread’.23 The often coercive response of the
state to the escalation of crime in these relatively
recently democratised societies has, ‘far from
solving the problem… engender(ed) a spiral of
corruption and violence which leads many
citizens to opt for private measures, whether
private security agencies or vigilantism’.24 This has
led to what some analysts have called ‘uncivil’
democracy. James Holsten argues in this vein that
during what Samuel Huntington has
characterised as a ‘third wave’ of democracy, the
proportion of uncivil democracies to the total
number of electoral democracies doubled:
In such uncivil democracies, violence, injustice,
and impunity are norms. As a result, uncivil
electoral democracies share significant features
of citizenship. Their institutions of law and
justice undergo delegitimization; violent crime
and police abuse escalate: the poor and
ethnically other are criminalized,
dehumanized, and attacked; civility and civil
protection in public spaces decline; people
abandon the public to retreat behind private
security; and illegal measures of control receive
massive popular support. Across the nation-
state, the civil components of citizenship are
unevenly and irregularly distributed among
citizens.25
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It is in this context that international comparative
studies with a range of other countries that have
undergone recent processes of democratisation,
and are characterised by high levels of inequality,
could help shed significant light on how we
understand the processes and nature of violent
crime in the South African context – which might
be unique but is not exceptional. Secondly, an
international perspective on the problem would
also provide for the sharing and assessment of
forms of intervention that could be most suitable.
Thus, ‘a cross-national perspective holds
important lessons in understanding not only the
unique features of each society but also the degree
to which similar processes of political, economic
or social change produce similar outcomes in
terms of crime levels and problems of police
reform'.26
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